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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
This case marks the latest chapter in the bitter feud 
between Commerce Bank, which has since merged with TD 
Bank, and its former CEO, Vernon W. Hill, II.  See generally 
Hill v. TD Bank, NA, 586 F. App’x 874 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Commerce Bancorp, LLC v. Hill, No. 08-cv-5628, 2010 WL 
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2545166 (D.N.J. June 18, 2010).  Beset by acrimony, TD 
Bank filed this copyright lawsuit against Hill, alleging that a 
portion of his 2012 book infringes a neglected manuscript that 
Hill co-authored while CEO of Commerce Bank.  In 
enjoining Hill from publishing or marketing his book, the 
District Court concluded that TD Bank owned the copyright 
under a letter agreement and that Hill’s book irreparably 
violated the Bank’s “right to not use the copyright.”  App. 9.  
In this denouement, we resolve certain open questions in our 
Circuit concerning employees’ rights to their artistic creations 
and the proper exercise of equitable discretion. 
We conclude that, although the agreement between the 
parties did not vest initial ownership of the copyright in the 
Bank by purporting to designate the manuscript a work “for 
hire,” it did transfer any ownership interest Hill possessed to 
TD Bank.  As a result, Hill’s co-ownership defense, like his 
other defenses, fails.  As for the imposition of injunctive 
relief, however, we cannot accept the District Court’s 
sweeping conclusions, which would justify the issuance of an 
injunction in every copyright case.  Instead of employing 
“categorical rule[s]” that would resolve the propriety of 
injunctive relief “in a broad swath of cases,” courts should 
issue injunctive relief only if the moving party makes a 
sufficient showing that such relief is warranted under the 
particular circumstances of that case.  eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s permanent 
injunction. 
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I. Background1 
Described by American Banker as “the closest thing 
that the staid banking industry has to a rock star,” App. 1157, 
Vernon W. Hill, II headed Commerce Bank from its launch as 
a single “store” in 1973 until June 2007, a few months before 
TD Bank acquired it for approximately $8.5 billion.  Hill built 
Commerce Bank in the highly saturated commercial banking 
industry by emphasizing customer loyalty through initiatives 
such as extended hours, quick account openings, and free 
perks at branches.    His success also brought him personal 
acclaim, including articles in The Wall Street Journal, 
American Banker, The Guardian, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
and The Daily Telegraph. 
As CEO of Commerce Bank, Hill reported to the 
Board of Directors and handled the day-to-day management 
of the Bank’s affairs, including reviewing the Bank’s 
finances, visiting its stores, and handling real estate and 
insurance matters.  Under his employment agreement with 
Commerce Bank, Hill had “primary responsibility for all 
operations of Commerce and its subsidiaries . . . , provided 
that such duties are consistent with his present duties,” and 
agreed to “devote his full time and best efforts to the business 
and affairs of Commerce and its subsidiaries.”  App. 803.  
                                              
1 We recount the facts largely based on the parties’ 
statements of undisputed facts with occasional references 
directly to the testimony and documentary evidence cited 
therein.  For facts bearing on summary judgment, we view the 
record in the light most favorable to Hill, as the losing party.  
See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 
1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Notwithstanding this commitment, however, the Agreement 
allowed Hill to pursue “outside activities,” which the 
Agreement did not define.  App. 803. 
In 2006, Hill decided to write a book about his 
business philosophy and more than 30-year tenure at the 
Bank.  Seeing this as a marketing opportunity, Commerce 
Bank supported the endeavor by hiring a business book 
author, Robert Andelman, to collaborate with Hill in drafting 
the manuscript.  Hill exchanged some emails about the 
project during weekdays but primarily worked on the project 
during evenings and weekends.  Other Commerce Bank 
employees sometimes assisted, for example, by answering 
Andelman’s inquiries and providing feedback about the 
manuscript.  The final manuscript, completed in 2007, 
recounts Commerce Bank’s history and business model from 
Hill’s perspective.  Resembling both an autobiography and a 
marketing tool, the 2007 manuscript included both a personal 
dedication to Hill’s wife and “the entire Commerce team,” 
App. 834, and a $20 gift certificate to open an account at 
Commerce Bank. 
Commerce Bank spearheaded the publication efforts 
by entering into an agreement with Portfolio, a division of 
Penguin Books.  In this publishing agreement, Commerce 
Bank, which is defined as the “Author,” represented and 
warranted that it was the exclusive owner of all rights 
conveyed in the manuscript: 
The Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] hereby 
represents and warrants . . . that Vernon Hill is 
the sole author of the Work; that the Work is or 
will be Vernon Hill’s next book length 
work . . . ; that the Author is the sole and 
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exclusive owner of all rights granted to the 
Publisher in this Agreement and has not 
assigned, pledged or otherwise encumbered the 
same; . . . that the Author has full power to 
enter into this Agreement and to make the 
grants herein contained. 
App. 1142.  For his part, Vernon Hill signed a letter to 
Portfolio that referred to an attached copy of the publishing 
agreement and provided: 
I hereby unconditionally guarantee, promise 
and agree with the Publisher, its successors and 
assigns that the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] 
will, in all respects, faithfully perform and 
fulfill all obligations of the Agreement on its 
part to be performed and fulfilled at the time 
and in the manner therein provided.  I also 
unconditionally guarantee that the Work is a 
work made for hire within the meaning of the 
United States Copyright Law and that the 
Author is the owner of copyright in the Work 
and has full power and authority to enter into 
the Agreement. 
App. 1139.  Both this letter agreement and the publishing 
agreement contain New York choice-of-law provisions. 
But the best laid schemes of mice and men often go 
awry:  The relationship between Hill and Commerce Bank 
soured, culminating in Hill’s termination and TD Bank’s 
acquisition of Commerce Bank.  See Hill, 586 F. App’x at 
877.  As a result, the 2007 manuscript was never published, 
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and by April 2008, Commerce Bank terminated the 
publishing agreement with Portfolio. 
As the years progressed, however, Hill sought to make 
use of certain portions of the manuscript.  By July 2010, Hill 
had debuted his next commercial banking venture, Metro 
Bank UK.  The bank’s launch, the first in Great Britain for 
over a century, garnered significant press coverage on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Capitalizing on this comeback, Hill co-
authored another book with Andelman—this one describing 
Hill’s experiences founding Metro Bank UK, the British 
banking system, and Hill’s pet insurance company, Petplan 
USA.  The book, entitled FANS! Not Customers: How to 
Create Growth Companies in a No-Growth World, became 
available in November 2012 through online booksellers such 
as Amazon and barnesandnoble.com.  Hill also publicized the 
book’s launch through interviews, including with Jim Cramer, 
the host of Mad Money on CNBC, and with a columnist for 
the Philadelphia Inquirer. 
The plot thickened when this new endeavor came to 
the attention of TD Bank.  Having shelved the 2007 
manuscript for years, the Bank suddenly registered it with the 
Copyright Office and sent take-down demands to twenty 
retailers alleging that Hill’s book infringed its copyright.  
Shortly thereafter, it filed suit in the District of New Jersey 
for copyright infringement. 
As the litigation progressed, discovery revealed that 
TD Bank had little actually at stake:  TD Bank admitted that, 
at most, 16% of the book infringed the 2007 manuscript, and 
that it has never published the 2007 manuscript or any 
competing work and has no interest in doing so. 
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Nonetheless, in its summary judgment opinion, the 
District Court concluded that, because the letter agreement 
“deem[ed] the work to be a work made for hire,” it was in 
fact a work for hire, vesting the copyright in the 2007 
manuscript with Commerce Bank as Hill’s employer.  App. 
35 n.10.  Rejecting Hill’s infringement defenses, the District 
Court determined that Hill had copied expressive content that 
was not unprotectable under the merger and scène-à-faire 
doctrines.  And Hill’s copying, the District Court held, was 
not fair use because Hill did not repurpose the copied portion; 
the original manuscript was unpublished; and Hill’s 
infringement would likely result in “some impairment” to the 
market for the 2007 manuscript “should TD Bank ever choose 
to publish [it].”  App. 48 (emphasis omitted).  But the District 
Court declined to issue an injunction, explaining that TD 
Bank had failed to show a likelihood of continued 
infringement and had not addressed at all the adequacy of 
legal remedies or the balance of hardships. 
Hill faced his peripeteia in this litigation a year later.  
Confronted with evidence of Hill’s continued promotion of 
the 2012 book and distribution of complimentary copies at a 
local chamber of commerce event, the District Court enjoined 
Hill from “publish[ing], market[ing], distribut[ing] or 
sell[ing]” the 2012 book.  App. 4.  This conduct, the District 
Court found, irreparably harmed TD Bank by depriving it of 
the “right to not use the copyright.”  App. 9.  Hill timely 
appealed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
There is no final judgment in this case because the 
District Court has stayed TD Bank’s request for infringer’s 
profits under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) pending the outcome of this 
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appeal.  See Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 190–92 (3d 
Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Thus, we have jurisdiction 
only over the District Court’s “grant[]” of a permanent 
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).2  See Marshak, 240 
F.3d at 190.  Before reaching the merits of Hill’s appeal, we 
must first address TD Bank’s contention that this appeal is 
moot and that we lack jurisdiction to consider the District 
Court’s summary judgment ruling, even to the extent that it 
served as the necessary predicate for the permanent 
injunction.  We reject both arguments. 
A. Mootness 
TD Bank first contends that this appeal is moot 
because Hill released a revised version of the book about a 
month after the District Court issued the injunction and, as 
TD Bank posits in a footnote to its appellate brief, “the July 7, 
2016 Kindle version [of Hill’s book] . . . does not infringe on 
the 2007 manuscript.”3  Appellee’s Br. 3 n.1. 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a). 
3 TD Bank’s and Hill’s motions to supplement the 
record on appeal are granted insofar as they pertain to events 
that transpired since the District Court’s decision.  See Clark 
v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(limitations on supplementing the record do not preclude 
appellate court from considering “unrebutted” evidence to 
determine whether an appeal is moot); see also McKay v. 
Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (appellate court 
may consider after-acquired evidence pertaining to the merits 
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Compliance with an injunction can moot an appeal if 
there is no “reasonable expectation” that the injunction will 
govern the enjoined party’s future conduct or otherwise injure 
him.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.25 (1979); see 
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1326 (3d Cir. 
1995); 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3533.2.2 (3d ed. 2018).  Yet TD Bank’s footnote 
conceding that the July 7, 2016 Kindle version does not 
infringe the 2007 manuscript hardly constitutes the broad 
“unconditional and irrevocable” covenant not to sue that is 
needed to moot a case.  See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 
U.S. 85, 93 (2013) (applying the voluntary-cessation 
doctrine).  Even if we accept the footnote as legally binding, 
it applies only to “the July 7, 2016 Kindle version.”  
Appellee’s Br. 3 n.1.  In fact, at oral argument, TD Bank’s 
counsel refused to concede that any other version of the 
revised book complied with the injunction, demanding twice 
that Hill first “certif[y]” that he will not publish, distribute, or 
otherwise market the 2012 book (which sounds much like a 
consent decree).  Third Cir. Arg. Recording at 57:48–58:06, 
58:38–58:50.4  The record also reflects that the Bank sent two 
letters asserting that the rewritten book may still contain 
copyrighted content; the latter letter threatened to bring 
contempt sanctions against Hill.  Hill, meanwhile, continues 
to profess his intention “to share the earlier book.”  
Appellant’s Reply Br. 3. 
                                                                                                     
of a claim “for the sake of thoroughness” if it would “not 
change the outcome” of the appeal (citation omitted)). 
4 The recording of oral argument can be found at 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
2897TDBankNAvVernonWHill.mp3. 
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TD Bank’s other arguments on appeal are inconsistent 
with its assertion that this case is moot.  For instance, the 
Bank urges us not to vacate the permanent injunction if we 
conclude that this appeal is moot, see United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), because doing so 
would “permit the infringing 2012 Book to become 
available.”  Appellee’s Br. 3 n.3.  That is to say, TD Bank 
does believe the injunction meaningfully constrains Hill’s 
future conduct.  And, in the same brief as its footnote 
concession, TD Bank accuses Hill of “continu[ing] to infringe 
TD Bank’s copyright in the 2007 Manuscript” even “after the 
entry of the PI order.”  Appellee’s Br. 24 n.12.  TD Bank’s 
motion to supplement the record reiterates these allegations, 
citing material that supposedly “evidences the District Court’s 
prescience in finding that Mr. Hill was likely to continue 
infringing TD Bank’s copyright.”  Appellee’s Mot. Suppl. R. 
at 8 (Apr. 25, 2018). 
TD Bank cannot have it both ways:  Hill cannot be 
both a continuing infringer and fully compliant with the 
permanent injunction.  As there is at least a reasonable 
likelihood that the injunction controls Hill’s future conduct, 
this appeal is not moot.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 543 n.25. 
B. Scope of the Appeal 
TD Bank next contends that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the non-appealable 
summary judgment order—even to the extent that the 
permanent injunction order rests on its determination of 
ownership and liability—because Hill did not separately 
identify the summary judgment order in his notice of appeal.  
We are unpersuaded. 
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Our interlocutory jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) 
encompasses matters “inextricably linked” with the issuance 
of a permanent injunction.  Marshak, 240 F.3d at 190; 
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(en banc).  Applying this standard, we have previously 
reviewed summary judgment orders that made the 
determination of liability necessary for the issuance of a 
permanent injunction.  See, e.g., Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. 
v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 819 (3d Cir. 2006); Cureton v. 
NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1999).  Although we 
acquire jurisdiction only over orders specified or “fairly 
inferred” in the notice of appeal, we construe such notices 
liberally.  Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  To that end, we have held that we may 
review an unspecified order if (1) it is connected to those 
specified in the notice of appeal, (2) the intent to appeal the 
unspecified order is “apparent,” and (3) the appellee is not 
prejudiced.  Id. at 127; Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 
137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Hill did not separately identify the summary judgment 
order in his notice of appeal.  Insofar as this was error, it is 
understandable because Hill cannot directly appeal the 
summary judgment order under § 1292(a)(1).  At a minimum, 
the summary judgment order falls within those unspecified 
orders that we may consider on appeal.  See Wiest, 710 F.3d 
at 127.  The summary judgment order established two 
fundamental prerequisites for issuing a copyright 
injunction—namely, TD Bank’s ownership of the copyright 
and Hill’s liability for infringement.  The District Court also 
made repeated references in its permanent injunction opinion 
to its summary judgment decision, including incorporating by 
reference that order’s rendition of the undisputed facts.  Nor 
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can TD Bank seriously claim that the failure to specify the 
summary judgment order prejudiced it, as the record is 
complete and the Bank had notice of—and fully briefed—the 
ownership and liability issues. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2012), 
which held that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review 
the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment, even 
though it was not specifically listed in the notice of appeal 
from a permanent injunction.  Id. at 250 n.3.  The summary 
judgment decision, the Second Circuit stressed, was “the 
principal legal basis” for issuing the permanent injunction and 
“[a]ny doubt” should have been dispelled by the injunction 
opinion’s reference to the prior order.  Id.  We concur and 
conclude that our jurisdiction extends to the District Court’s 
summary judgment decision, inasmuch as that decision 
resolved ownership of the copyright and Hill’s liability. 
III. Discussion 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 64 
(3d Cir. 2014), and its grant of a permanent injunction for 
abuse of discretion, Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, 442 F.3d at 819.  
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on an 
incorrect legal standard, a clearly erroneous factual finding, 
or a misapplication of the law to the facts.  Id.  We may 
affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it departs 
from the District Court’s rationale.  Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. 
City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1988). 
To prevail at summary judgment, TD Bank needed to 
establish that: (1) it possessed exclusive rights in the 2007 
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manuscript, and (2) Hill’s 2012 book copied protected 
expression without privilege.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).   The Bank then needed 
to show that the District Court should exercise its discretion 
to award permanent injunctive relief.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  
We address each requirement in turn.5 
A. Exclusive Rights in the 2007 Manuscript 
TD Bank and Hill dispute whether the Bank 
exclusively owns the copyright in the 2007 manuscript.  Hill 
claims that his contributions to the work make him at least a 
                                              
5 Although we ultimately vacate the injunction under 
eBay’s four-factor test, we decline to merely assume that TD 
Bank exclusively owns the 2007 manuscript and that Hill’s 
liability defenses fail.  Without resolving the issue here, we 
note that several circuits have held that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate ownership of exclusive rights to establish 
“standing,” without explaining whether they mean this 
requirement is jurisdictional.  See Urbont v. Sony Music 
Entm’t, 831 F.3d 80, 88 n.6 (2d Cir. 2016); Righthaven LLC 
v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013); see also 
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 
2011) (recounting that the district court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of standing because the plaintiff did not 
own any rights in the work).  The Federal Circuit views the 
concomitant ownership requirement under the Patent Act as 
jurisdictional.  See, e.g., Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational 
Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Resolving 
the ownership dispute on this appeal will put to rest any 
jurisdictional concerns and, along with considering Hill’s 
liability defenses, will help advance this litigation on remand. 
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joint author, in which case TD Bank could not sue him for 
copyright infringement.  See Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 
55, 68 (3d Cir. 2014); Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 
(2d Cir. 1984).  TD Bank does not dispute that Hill made an 
artistic contribution sufficient to secure authorial rights but 
contends that Commerce Bank exclusively owned the work 
through the letter agreement that Hill signed or because it 
satisfied the traditional agency criteria for determining 
whether a work falls within the scope of employment.  
Although the meaning of authorship has bedeviled 
philosophers and writers for centuries, see, e.g., Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgment 174–88 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., 
1987) (1790), we can resolve it here based on the Copyright 
Act and controlling precedent.  Hill’s co-ownership defense 
founders if: (1) the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations bars 
the defense, (2) TD Bank exclusively owns the manuscript 
under the letter agreement, or (3) Hill created it within the 
scope of his employment under agency-law principles.  We 
consider these issues seriatim. 
1. The Copyright Act’s Three-Year Statute of 
Limitations Does Not Apply to Hill’s Co-
Ownership Defense 
Before addressing the merits of Hill’s co-ownership 
defense, we must address TD Bank’s argument that the 
Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations prevents us 
from even considering it.  Typically, a statute of limitations 
aims to “keep stale litigation out of the courts,” not to bar the 
“consideration of a particular defense” in timely litigation.  
United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956).  
Hence, the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations 
does not preclude a defendant in an infringement action from 
  
17 
raising an ownership defense.6  Pritchett v. Pound, 473 F.3d 
217, 220 (5th Cir. 2006); Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice 
Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2003); 3 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 12.05 (2018) (hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright) (observing 
that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations “has no 
purchase when a plaintiff attempts to invoke [it] . . . to defeat 
a defendant’s position of being the pertinent author,” because 
it operates only as a defense against claims or counterclaims).  
This rule holds true even if the defendant also brings an 
untimely ownership counterclaim.  Burne Hogarth, 342 F.3d 
at 164.  Thus, irrespective of whether Hill’s co-ownership 
counterclaim is time-barred (a question we lack jurisdiction to 
reach), the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations does not 
prevent Hill from raising co-ownership as a defense to TD 
Bank’s infringement lawsuit. 
2. The Letter Agreement Granted TD Bank 
Exclusive Ownership of the 2007 
Manuscript 
The District Court correctly determined that TD Bank 
exclusively owns the rights to the 2007 manuscript under the 
letter agreement, but it did so based on a mistaken belief that 
the letter agreement vested original ownership in the Bank by 
“deem[ing]” the work to be a work “for hire.”  App. 35 n.10.  
                                              
6 Notably, the Lanham Act does preclude a defendant 
from challenging, among other issues, the ownership of a 
registered trademark after five years if the registered owner 
complies with certain formalities; the Act calls these marks 
“incontestable.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b).  The Copyright 
Act contains no analogous provision. 
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To explain why we nonetheless affirm, we must tease out the 
distinction between the work-for-hire and assignment 
doctrines, explaining how those doctrines relate to the terms 
of the agreement here. 
Work-for-Hire Doctrine.  The 1976 Copyright Act’s 
definition of a “work made for hire” reflects a “carefully 
worked out compromise” between the artistic guilds, whose 
members disfavored the work-for-hire doctrine because of 
their lesser bargaining power, and the major publishers, 
studios, and record labels, which supported a broader work-
for-hire doctrine to facilitate the acquisition of rights.  Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence (“CCNV”) v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
745–48 & nn.11–14 (1989) (citation omitted).  The Act 
defines a work for hire as either (1) a work created by an 
employee within the scope of his employment, or (2) a 
“specially ordered or commissioned” work if it falls within 
nine enumerated categories of works and the parties agree in 
writing to designate it as a work for hire.  17 U.S.C. § 101.  
The definition thus establishes “two mutually exclusive 
means” by which a work can attain for-hire status:  the first 
for employees, and the second for independent contractors.  
CCNV, 490 U.S. at 742–43. 
The 2007 manuscript does not meet the second 
definition because Hill did not serve as an independent 
contractor and the manuscript does not fall within any of the 
nine enumerated categories of works.  Accordingly, the 
manuscript could only receive work-for-hire treatment if it 
satisfied the first definition—that is, if Hill, while an 
employee of TD Bank, created it within the scope of his 
employment.  To determine whether a work falls within the 
scope of employment, courts should apply general principles 
of agency law.  Id. at 738, 740–41.   
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In its summary judgment decision, the District Court 
recited these principles correctly but nonetheless accepted TD 
Bank’s argument that the letter agreement itself vested 
exclusive ownership with the Bank, stating that “[l]anguage 
in a written instrument . . . that deems the work to be a work 
made for hire within the meaning of the Copyright Act may 
. . . vest ownership exclusively with an employer.”  App. 35 
n.10.   
That was error.  It appears the District Court confused 
an original vesting of ownership under the work-for-hire 
doctrine with a transfer of ownership rights via an 
assignment.  By its terms, the Copyright Act recognizes only 
nine specified categories of works by independent contractors 
that can be deemed “for hire” through a signed writing.  17 
U.S.C. § 101(2).  For an employee’s work to receive for-hire 
treatment, by contrast, the work must actually come within 
the “scope of his or her employment.”  Id. § 101(1).  Certain 
writings, such as negotiated employment agreements, may 
sometimes help clarify the scope of employment, when 
considered under general agency-law principles.  See U.S. 
Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 
1018 (9th Cir. 2012); but cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 424–25 (2006) (observing that “[f]ormal job descriptions 
often bear little resemblance” to an employee’s actual duties, 
and the mere inclusion of a task in a job description “is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that 
conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s 
professional duties”).  But a bare statement that a particular 
work is “for hire,” says nothing about the scope of an 
individual’s employment and cannot suffice on its own.  Had 
Congress intended to permit parties to “deem” works by 
employees as “for hire,” it would have so specified in 
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subsection 101(1), just as it did for independent contractors in 
subsection 101(2).  Id.  But it did not.  And where, as here, 
“Congress has shown that it knows how to [adopt a measure] 
in express terms,” it is “particularly inappropriate” to extend 
that policy to another subsection lacking such language.  
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007); 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002). 
Whether a writing operates to render a work “for hire” 
or to assign the author’s interest may seem like a distinction 
without a difference.  But that distinction, though technical, 
does carry some practical consequences.  If a work qualifies 
as a work for hire, the Act treats the employer or principal as 
the author, and the copyright presumptively vests in the 
principal unless the parties execute an agreement to the 
contrary.  17 U.S.C. § 201(b).  If a work does not satisfy the 
statutory definition, the author can still assign it but retains 
certain non-waivable rights to cancel the transfer after 35–40 
years, id. § 203(a)(3), and—depending on the type of work—
waivable moral rights in the work’s proper attribution and 
integrity, id. § 106A(a).  The creator of a work for hire has 
neither, see id. §§ 101, 106A(a), 203(a), so allowing parties to 
deem a work as “for hire” without fulfilling the statutory 
requirements would undercut the Copyright Act’s protection 
of those termination and moral rights and would negate the 
difference between a work for hire and an assigned work.7  
That difference underscores why an employee’s work created 
                                              
7 A work’s status also determines the duration of the 
copyright: A work-for-hire copyright has a fixed term of 95–
120 years, while an ordinary copyright generally persists for 
the life of the author plus 70 years.  17 U.S.C. §§ 302(b), (c). 
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outside the scope of employment cannot simply be 
“deem[ed]” for hire. 
Our view accords with those of leading copyright 
scholars and other Courts of Appeals.  The Nimmer treatise, 
for instance, observes that “an agreement . . . whereby works 
prepared by the employee that are not prepared within the 
scope of employment are nevertheless deemed to be ‘works 
made for hire’ will not in itself convert such works into the 
‘for hire’ category.”  1 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 5.03[B][1][b][ii]; accord Goldstein on Copyright § 4.3 (3d 
ed. 2018) (noting that, unless the work satisfies the 
“objective” criteria of the work-for-hire doctrine, “A’s 
express agreement that the work prepared by A will constitute 
a work made for hire by B will not suffice to make the work 
one for hire, nor to make B the author”); F. Jay Dougherty, 
Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion 
Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 225, 
317–18 (2001) (“Parties cannot simply agree that works not 
within the scope of employment are works made for hire with 
the employer deemed the author.”).  Our sister circuits 
likewise agree that, although parties to an employment 
relationship can agree to alter the statutory presumption that a 
work-for-hire copyright vests with the employer, they cannot 
by contract “vary the work’s status as a work made for hire.”  
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing M. Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright § 5.03[D] (1985)); see Saenger Org., 
Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 55, 
62 (1st Cir. 1997); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 
F.3d 280, 291 (2d Cir. 2002). 
For these reasons, the District Court was mistaken in 
concluding that the letter agreement vested ownership in the 
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Bank by deeming the manuscript a work for hire.  But 
although it affixed the wrong label, the Court’s determination 
of ownership was correct because the agreement operated as 
an assignment—the issue to which we now turn. 
Assignment.  The validity and import of an assignment 
generally is governed by state contract law.  See Roger Miller 
Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 392 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 
1999).  The Copyright Act merely adds that an assignment 
must be memorialized by an “instrument of conveyance, or a 
note or memorandum of the transfer, . . . in writing and 
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s 
duly authorized agent.”  17 U.S.C. § 204(a); see Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Here, the parties agree that New York law applies 
under the letter agreement’s choice-of-law clause.  Under that 
state’s law, courts construe assignments using the “same rules 
which obtain in the interpretation of other contracts,” Crook 
v. Rindskopf, 12 N.E. 174, 177 (N.Y. 1887), which include 
giving effect to the parties’ intent as principally expressed 
through the words of the agreement itself, Greenfield v. 
Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002).  
Resort to extrinsic evidence is permitted only if ambiguity 
exists within the four corners of the agreement.  Brad H. v. 
City of New York, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2011).  If it 
does not, a court should construe the agreement to “carry out 
the plain purpose and object” of the contract and to give 
effect to the parties’ “over-all intention.”   Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (citation omitted).  The 
agreement need not comply with any formalities or invoke 
particular language to constitute an assignment; any writing 
will suffice as long as “the assignor has, in some fashion, 
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manifested an intention to make a present transfer of his 
rights to the assignee.”  Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. 
Romano, 147 A.D.3d 1021, 1023 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(citation and emphasis omitted); Whalen v. Gerzof, 206 
A.D.2d 688, 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
The letter agreement evinces that intention in both of 
its principal covenants.  In the first, Hill acknowledged the 
publishing agreement, a copy of which was attached to the 
letter, and “guarantee[d], promise[d] and agree[d] with the 
Publisher . . . that the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] will, in 
all respects, faithfully perform and fulfill all obligations of the 
Agreement.”  App. 1139.  That publishing agreement 
provided that “the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] is the sole 
and exclusive owner of all rights granted to the Publisher in 
this Agreement and has not assigned, pledged or otherwise 
encumbered the same; . . . that the Author has full power to 
enter into this Agreement and to make the grants herein 
contained.”  App. 1142.  In the second covenant, Hill 
“unconditionally guarantee[d] that the Work is a work made 
for hire within the meaning of the United States Copyright 
Law and that the Author is the owner of copyright in the 
Work and has full power and authority to enter into the 
Agreement.”  App. 1139. 
Hill makes much of the letter’s use of the word 
“guarantee,” for a guarantee typically describes an agreement 
to pay a principal obligor’s debt upon that party’s default; the 
guarantor does not become a party to the underlying 
agreement and assumes only secondary liability.  Midland 
Steel Warehouse Corp. v. Godinger Silver Art Ltd., 276 
A.D.2d 341, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  But the mere use of 
the word “guarantee” in a contract “does not necessarily 
establish the nature of the obligation,” because the term, when 
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read in context, may not establish a guarantor-guarantee 
relationship.  Brewster Transit Mix Corp. v. McLean, 169 
A.D.2d 1036, 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).  In Brewster, for 
example, the New York Appellate Division concluded that a 
defendant assumed primary liability under an agreement 
providing that the party, both individually and as an officer of 
a corporation, “guarantee[d] to pay within the established 
terms for all purchases charged to my account.”  Id. at 1036.  
Although the agreement used the word “guarantee,” the court 
concluded that it in fact reflected the defendant’s assumption 
of primary liability as a co-obligor.  Id. at 1037; see also New 
York Plumber’s Specialties Co. v. 91 E. End Corp., 366 
N.E.2d 866, 867 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding that an agreement 
under which the “undersigned . . . guarantee[d] the full and 
prompt payment to you, of all indebtedness due to you” was 
not a guarantee despite the use of that term). 
Read as a whole, the terms of the letter agreement do 
not manifest an intent to assume secondary liability.  
Although Hill’s commitment “guarantee[ing], promis[ing] 
and agree[ing]” that Commerce Bank would fulfill its 
obligations could by itself suggest a guarantee, Hill separately 
“guarantee[d]” that the manuscript “is a work made for hire,” 
that Commerce Bank “is the owner of copyright,” and that the 
Bank “has full power to enter into” the publishing agreement.  
App. 1139.  Nothing in these latter provisions resembles a 
true guarantee, as Hill assumed these obligations without 
reference to any other agreement or any other party’s 
obligations. 
Instead, Hill’s commitments together convey an 
unmistakable intent to effect a present transfer of any interest 
he possessed in the manuscript.  Hill’s assurance that the 
manuscript “is a work made for hire,” App. 1139, though 
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insufficient to actually render it for hire, denotes an intent to 
relinquish his interest in the copyright.  See 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 5.03[B][1][b][ii].  The use of the definite article 
“the” in “[Commerce Bank] is the owner of copyright” also 
implies that Commerce Bank is the sole owner of the 
copyright.  App. 1139; see, e.g., Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2011).  And this 
implication gains force in the second half of that sentence, 
which provides that Commerce Bank has “full power” to 
execute the publishing agreement, because a co-owner lacks 
the authority to grant a truly exclusive license without the 
consent of all co-owners.  Brownstein, 742 F.3d at 68; see 
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007).  Finally, any 
lingering doubt is dispelled by the letter’s reference to the 
publishing agreement, which states that Commerce Bank “is 
the sole and exclusive owner of all rights granted to the 
Publisher in this Agreement.”8  App. 1142 (emphasis added). 
We recognize that courts do not lightly infer that a 
party has assigned his interest in a copyright, particularly 
given the Copyright Act’s writing requirement, and in 
doubtful cases, a document should not be construed to divest 
an author completely of his ownership interest.  See Baisden 
v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(endorsed check for royalties did not constitute an 
assignment); Radio Television Espanola S.A. v. New World 
Entm’t, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1999) (fax 
referencing a deal without any indication of its terms and 
                                              
8 To the extent that Hill suggests that an assignment 
would fail unless he entered into an agreement directly with 
the assignee (Commerce Bank), he is mistaken.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 327 cmt. a (1981). 
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another discussing contract negotiations did not satisfy the 
writing requirement); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 
549, 564 (2d Cir. 1995) (accepting, as not clearly erroneous, 
the district court’s finding that a stamp on an endorsed check 
“assign[ing] . . . all right, title and interest” without 
mentioning “copyright” constituted an assignment of only the 
physical copy of a painting).  We do not decide whether any 
of Hill’s commitments standing alone, including the failed 
attempt to deem the work for hire, would suffice to effect an 
assignment.  When considered as a whole, however, the letter 
agreement satisfies the requirements of an assignment under 
both the Copyright Act and New York law, and we will 
affirm the District Court’s ownership determination on this 
basis.9 
                                              
9 Our dissenting colleague slices TD Bank’s argument 
thinly, arguing that we should not affirm because it “waived” 
the assignment issue.  While we take this opportunity to 
clarify that a work cannot fall within the scope of 
employment without satisfying agency-law criteria, the 
District Court’s contract-law analysis, though adopting 
incorrect nomenclature, was sound.  In fact, Hill (correctly) 
observes in his opening brief that the District Court conflated 
the two doctrines and therefore devotes more than four pages 
to the assignment question (even labeling it as such).  In 
considering whether Hill assigned any interest he had, we do 
not stray from the passages in the agreements that TD Bank 
identified in its interrogatory response as giving it exclusive 
ownership and that the parties dispute on appeal.  Where two 
arguments relate so closely, neither is waived or forfeited.  
See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 
374, 380 (1995) (considering an alternative argument where 
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the petition, “though couched in terms of a different but 
closely related theory, fairly embraced [it]”). 
In any event, we may affirm on any ground supported 
by the record as long as the appellee did not waive—as 
opposed to forfeit—the issue.  Compare Bistrian v. Levi, 912 
F.3d 79, 88–89 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming in part based on a 
“threshold question of law” that the appellees neither raised 
below nor on appeal), with Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 
575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009) (appellee waived a separate 
argument by “explicitly disclaim[ing]” it).  Much like the 
other statements our dissenting colleague references, the 
Bank’s response to a request for admission admitted the lack 
of an assignment only “to the extent that” the Bank argued 
that initial ownership had already vested with the Bank under 
the same agreement.  App. 1307 (emphasis added).  A request 
for admission does not serve as a proper substitute for a 
contentions interrogatory, see United Coal Cos. v. Powell 
Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967–68 (3d Cir. 1988), and Hill 
neither sought clarification of TD Bank’s response nor moved 
to have the matter deemed fully admitted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
36(a)(6); 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 2260 (3d ed. 2019).  The Bank has consistently 
argued that it exclusively owns the 2007 manuscript under the 
letter agreement, and we see no reason to treat its mislabeling 
of that substantially correct contract-law argument as the 
“intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.”  Robinson 
v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2019). 
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3. Whether the Manuscript Fell Within the 
Scope of Hill’s Employment 
Although the letter agreement constitutes a valid 
assignment, the question remains whether the 2007 
manuscript fell within the scope of Hill’s employment.  If it 
did, the work would receive for-hire treatment and Hill would 
lack any right to terminate the assignment.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
203. 
This Court has not had occasion to expound on when a 
work falls within the scope of employment.  CCNV, however, 
held that the terms “employee” and “scope of employment” 
should be construed in light of general principles of agency 
law, citing section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency.  490 U.S. at 740.  Taking their cue from CCNV, 
other Courts of Appeals have concluded that a work falls 
within the scope of employment only if “[1] it is of the kind 
he is employed to perform; [2] it occurs substantially within 
the authorized time and space limits; and [3] it is actuated, at 
least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer].’”  Avtec 
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)) (internal 
alterations omitted); see U.S. Auto Parts Network, 692 F.3d at 
1015; Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 
F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004). 
We agree with our sister circuits that CCNV counsels 
in favor of adopting the Second Restatement’s test.  The 
second factor, however, deserves further explication:  
Although the test is phrased in the conjunctive, meaning that 
all three factors must be satisfied for a work to receive for-
hire treatment, courts must consider time and spatial bounds 
with care.  This factor is most probative for employees who 
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work shifts or otherwise have regular hours and definite 
workplaces.  See, e.g., City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. 
Supp. 3, 6, 8–9 (D.N.J. 1995) (law enforcement training 
course developed by a police officer while “off duty” fell 
outside the time and spatial boundaries of his employment).  
In our increasingly mobile work culture, however, many 
executives and professionals—for better or worse—lack 
obvious temporal or spatial boundaries for their work.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 cmt. b (2006) 
(explaining that the Third Restatement abandoned this factor 
because it “does not naturally encompass the working 
circumstances of many managerial and professional 
employees”).  For such employees, the second factor will 
illuminate little, and a fact-finder cannot indulge in the fiction 
of a 9-to-5 workday.  On the other hand, even when an 
employee’s position has ascertainable temporal and spatial 
boundaries, her unilateral decision to continue working at 
home or beyond normal hours has little bearing if a 
copyrighted work is clearly “of the kind” that the employee 
was hired to create.  Avtec Sys., 21 F.3d at 571; U.S. Auto 
Parts Network, 692 F.3d at 1018; 1 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 5.03[B][1][b][i]. 
Unfortunately, we are without the benefit of an opinion 
below applying the scope-of-employment test because the 
District Court considered only the effect of the letter 
agreement.  App. 35 n.10.  In a similar circumstance, after 
clarifying the agency-law principles that the district court 
should apply, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case, 
concluding that it was “not in a position to resolve that 
heavily fact-laden issue in the first instance.”  Avtec Sys., 21 
F.3d at 573.  We will follow the same course here, as the 
issue is close and may require the trier of fact to resolve 
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underlying factual disputes.  Cf. MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. 
Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Of course, Hill may choose to forgo this 
inquiry, but it is not academic because it would determine 
whether Hill or his successors may eventually terminate the 
assignment.  See 17 U.S.C. § 203.  We thus will leave it to the 
parties on remand to decide if they wish to open yet another 
chapter in this litigation. 
B. Liability for Infringement 
Having concluded that TD Bank owned the exclusive 
rights in the manuscript, we briefly address Hill’s defenses to 
infringement.  Hill devotes a few sentences to the merger and 
scenes à faire doctrines, as well as the fair-use defense.  The 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment to TD 
Bank on these defenses. 
The merger doctrine prohibits the copyrighting of 
expression “when ‘there are no or few other ways of 
expressing a particular idea.’”  Educ. Testing Servs. v. 
Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1253 (3d Cir. 1983)).  A variation on the merger doctrine, the 
scenes à faire doctrine leaves unprotected “incidents, 
characters or settings which are as a practical matter 
indispensable in the treatment of a given topic.”  Whelan 
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 
(3d Cir. 1986) (citation and internal alteration omitted).  Hill 
could express his life story and business philosophy in 
numerous ways, so the District Court properly concluded that 
the copied portions of the prior work were copyrightable. 
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As for fair use, the 2012 book was not 
transformative—i.e., it did not imbue the prior work with 
“new expression, meaning, or message”—so the permissible 
scope of fair use is more circumscribed.  See Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  Given 
this, as well as Hill’s commercial sales of the 2012 work, the 
unpublished nature of the 2007 manuscript, and the potential 
harm to the market for the original manuscript if TD Bank 
ever elected to publish it, the District Court correctly granted 
summary judgment to TD Bank on Hill’s fair-use defense.  
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 562, 563, 566–68 (1985). 
C. Propriety of the Injunction 
Finally, we turn to the propriety of the District Court’s 
permanent injunction banning the “publish[ing], market[ing], 
distribut[ing] or sell[ing]” of Hill’s 2012 book.  App. 4.  As a 
matter entrusted to a court’s equitable discretion, an 
injunction “does not follow from success on the merits as a 
matter of course.”  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 32 (2008).  Instead, even after prevailing on the 
merits, the party seeking a permanent injunction must make a 
sufficient showing that (1) it will suffer irreparable injury, (2) 
no remedy available at law could adequately remedy that 
injury, (3) the balance of hardships tips in its favor, and (4) an 
injunction would not disserve the public interest.  eBay, 547 
U.S. at 391.  While we consider these factors holistically, the 
inability to show irreparable harm—or, relatedly, that a legal 
remedy would be inadequate—defeats a request for injunctive 
relief.  See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
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Before eBay, this Circuit, like many others, applied a 
presumption of irreparable harm as long as a copyright 
plaintiff established a prima facie case or reasonable 
likelihood of success.  See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); Marco 
v. Accent Pub. Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1553 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Educ. Testing Servs., 793 F.2d at 543; Apple Comput., 714 
F.2d at 1254.  That presumption would go a long way toward 
supporting the District Court’s remedy here.  But we have 
cause to reconsider it in light of the Supreme Court’s 
intervening guidance. 
In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s longstanding rule requiring, absent “exceptional” or 
“unusual” circumstances, the imposition of a permanent 
injunction after a finding of patent infringement.  547 U.S. at 
393–94 (citation omitted).  eBay held that the Federal 
Circuit’s rule conflated rights with remedies by relying on the 
Patent Act’s statutory “right to exclude” to create such a 
presumption.  Id. at 392.  Rather, absent express 
Congressional guidance to the contrary, district courts retain 
discretion in resolving requests for injunctive relief, and 
“such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other 
cases.”  Id. at 394.  In so holding, eBay drew parallels to 
copyright law, where it had “consistently rejected” arguments 
that a permanent injunction should necessarily result from a 
finding of infringement.  Id. at 392–93.  It pointed, for 
example, to Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Association, 209 
U.S. 20 (1908), where the Court had affirmed a denial of an 
injunction for infringement of a reference book, agreeing with 
the lower courts that the infringing content was “so 
insignificant compared with the injury from stopping [the 
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defendant’s] use of their enormous volume.”  Id. at 23.  And 
it cited New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), 
where, after concluding that newspapers exceeded their 
licenses by republishing freelance journalists’ articles in 
electronic databases, the Court cautioned that “it hardly 
follows” that an injunction should issue to remedy the 
infringement.  Id. at 505; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 
(observing that copyright’s goals “are not always best served 
by automatically granting injunctive relief”); Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (doubting that “a broad injunction” 
should issue even if contributory liability attached). 
Although eBay concerned the Patent Act, we have 
found its logic more widely applicable.  Ferring Pharms., Inc. 
v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Thus, in Ferring, we abandoned our presumption of 
irreparable harm in Lanham Act cases as inconsistent with 
eBay’s admonition that courts may not fashion categorical 
rules or sweeping principles that would undermine the 
traditional four-factor test.  Id. at 213 & n.7, 216.  Instead, we 
held that an injunction may issue only if the plaintiff proves 
all four factors without the aid of any shortcuts.  Id. at 216. 
We have not reconsidered the presumption in 
copyright cases in particular since eBay, but several of our 
sister circuits have, and they have rejected it.  See, e.g., 
CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 111–12 (1st Cir. 
2008); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 
2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 
F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007); Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 
689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012); Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. 
v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Peter Letterese and Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology 
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Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008).  Notably, 
Ferring relied on one of these decisions, Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), which jettisoned the presumption 
of irreparable harm in copyright cases because eBay “strongly 
indicates” that the principles it reaffirmed should be “the 
presumptive standard for injunctions in any context” and 
eBay relied on the Court’s copyright jurisprudence.  607 F.3d 
at 78. 
Based on Ferring and this persuasive authority, we 
hold today that eBay abrogates our presumption of irreparable 
harm in copyright cases.  The Copyright Act does not direct 
courts to depart from traditional principles of equity in 
adjudicating requests for injunctive relief, see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 502(a), and eBay’s reliance on the Court’s copyright 
decisions makes its applicability even clearer here than in 
Ferring.  Accordingly, a court considering the propriety of a 
copyright injunction should no longer place a “thumb on the 
scales” in favor of injunctive relief and inquire merely 
whether “there is good reason why an injunction should not 
issue.”  Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 
157–58 (2010).  Nor can the four-factor test be faithfully 
applied through a “perfunctory recognition that ‘an injunction 
does not automatically issue,’” id. at 157–58 (citation 
omitted), or the factors’ rote invocation, see Winter, 555 U.S. 
at 26–27.  Irreparable harm in copyright cases “must be 
prove[n], not presumed.”  Flexible Lifeline Sys., 654 F.3d at 
1000 (quoting 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[A][5]). 
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in issuing this injunction. 
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1. Irreparable Injury 
To obtain a permanent injunction, a moving party must 
show that it will suffer irreparable harm that is causally 
attributable to the challenged infringement.  See Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2011); Apple 
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (Patent Act).  Even though TD Bank does not sell, 
license, or even use the infringed work and has no intention 
of ever doing so, it persuaded the District Court that Hill’s 
supposed continuing infringement irreparably harmed the 
Bank by depriving it of the “right to not use the copyright.”  
App. 9.  We disagree.  Neither the prospect of continued 
infringement nor the “right to not use” a copyright establish 
irreparable harm. 
At the outset, we can easily dismiss TD Bank’s 
contention that continued copyright infringement necessarily 
constitutes irreparable harm.  While a “substantial likelihood” 
of continuing infringement is necessary to obtain permanent 
injunctive relief, Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 
F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016); see Ferring, 765 F.3d at 219, the 
continuing nature of the infringement does not mean that any 
future injury would be irreparable, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1215 
(C.D. Cal. 2007); see Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming a 
district court’s conclusion that a patentee failed to show that 
the defendants’ “continuing infringement . . . has caused, and 
will continue to cause, irreparable harm”).  Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit has recognized that, after eBay, irreparable 
harm can no longer be presumed based on continued 
infringement and a likelihood of success on the merits.  See 
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 
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(Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 
32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (presuming irreparable 
harm before eBay upon a “strong showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits coupled with continuing infringement”).  
If continued infringement does not justify a presumption of 
irreparable harm, a fortiori it does not inherently give rise to 
irreparable harm.  Instead, the prospect that infringement will 
continue merely precipitates the question whether any future 
infringement would irreparably injure the copyright owner. 
The District Court’s reliance on “the right to not use 
the copyright” fares no better.  See App. 9.  Such a right is 
little more than a rephrasing of the right to exclude, which 
eBay held did not justify a presumption of irreparable harm.  
See 547 U.S. at 392–93.  Even when this Court presumed 
irreparable harm, we required “a stronger showing of 
irreparable harm” if the infringed copyright was “peripheral 
to the copyright holder’s business.”  Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d 
at 206 (citation and internal alterations omitted).  Holding that 
a violation of “the right to not use the copyright” necessarily 
amounts to irreparable harm would not only resurrect the 
presumption of irreparable harm, but make it irrebuttable, 
even where, as here, the infringement bears only a tangential 
relation to the copyright holder’s business.  Cf. High Tech 
Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 
1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction where the patentee did “not make or 
sell [the relevant products] and [did] not license their 
manufacture and sale”). 
Our position that a violation of “the right to not use [a] 
copyright” does not inherently establish irreparable harm 
finds further support in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).  
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There, an actor who allegedly was duped into making a five-
second performance for the anti-Muslim movie Innocence of 
Muslims sought an injunction to remove the movie from 
YouTube because its release resulted in a fatwa against her 
and threats against her family.  Id. at 737–39.  The en banc 
court noted that the actor’s alleged harms, though disturbing, 
bore little relation to any interest protected by copyright law.  
Id. at 745.  Copyright law grants authors exclusive rights in 
their expressive works to incentivize “the creation and 
publication of free expression”—not to protect an author’s 
privacy or reputation.  Id. at 744–45 (quoting Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)).  In seeking to remove 
the work (or at least her five-second performance) from 
YouTube, the Ninth Circuit concluded, the actor had not 
demonstrated any harm, much less irreparable harm, 
cognizable in copyright.10  Id. at 746.  We express no opinion 
on the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate holding, but its premise is one 
on which we agree:  A bare violation of a statutory right 
enshrined in the Copyright Act does not establish irreparable 
harm. 
In holding otherwise, the District Court relied on the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Salinger, which mused that “a 
copyright holder might . . . have a First Amendment interest 
in not speaking” and later asserted that “‘[t]he loss of First 
Amendment freedoms,’ and hence infringement of the right 
not to speak, ‘for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’”  607 F.3d at 
81 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  We do not view the 
                                              
10 Garcia accepted that a court may consider these 
collateral injuries where a copyright owner has a “strong 
copyright claim.”  Id. at 746. 
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Second Circuit as holding that copyright infringement 
amounts to compelled speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.  For one, Salinger vacated the district court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction and stressed that irreparable 
harm must be proven.  Id. at 82, 84.  Equating copyright 
infringement with compelled speech would justify an 
injunction whenever, as in Salinger, an author chooses not to 
distribute a work.  In addition, Salinger reiterated that 
copyright law aims to protect “the commercial interest of the 
artist/author” and “not to coddle artistic vanity or to protect 
secrecy.”  Id. at 81 n.9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting New Era 
Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 
1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Leval, J.)).  Yet secrecy is exactly 
what would be protected if the unauthorized distribution of a 
work were deemed an irreparable violation of the original 
author’s right not to speak.11 
                                              
11 Nor would characterizing copyright infringement as 
compelled speech make much sense.  Most obviously, 
copyright infringement generally lacks the state action needed 
to implicate the First Amendment.  See Max v. Republican 
Comm. of Lancaster Cty., 587 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2009).  
And even if it did, infringement would not equate with 
compelled speech because, regardless of whether the author 
takes offense, the infringer’s use does not coerce the 
copyright owner to “personally speak the government’s 
message” or “to host or accommodate another speaker’s 
message” so that “the complaining speaker’s own message 
was affected.”  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006).  Indeed, precisely 
because few authors would license their work for criticism or 
ridicule, copyright’s fair-use defense provides special 
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For these reasons, the District Court should not have 
relied on Hill’s violation of the “right to not use [a] 
copyright” alone to establish irreparable harm, App. 9, and 
because it did, it abused its discretion.  See Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 
(2014). 
2. Adequate Remedy at Law 
Although eBay identified irreparable harm and the 
adequacy of legal remedies as separate considerations, they 
typically constitute two sides of the same inquiry, for the 
“availability of adequate monetary damages belies a claim of 
irreparable injury.”  Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix 
Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted); see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court 
and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 997, 1026–27, 1048 
(2015) (“[T]hese formulations are customarily 
interchangeable.”).  Below, the District Court concluded that, 
because Hill was distributing the 2012 book for free, TD 
Bank’s injury “is . . . not easily quantifiable or compensable 
at law.”  App. 10.  This, too, was error. 
                                                                                                     
protection to derivative works like parodies.  See Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 579–81; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001).  Nor have the 
Copyright Act’s longstanding compulsory licensing 
provisions, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (compulsory cable 
license); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (compulsory cover license), ever 
come under serious First Amendment challenge as compelled 
speech. 
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Under the Copyright Act, a copyright holder may 
recover either actual damages and the infringer’s profits or 
statutory damages.  17 U.S.C. § 504(a).  Other circuits have 
interpreted the Act’s allowance of “actual damages” to permit 
reasonable royalty damages.  See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, 
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 163–72 (2d Cir. 2001); Dash v. 
Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 312 (4th Cir. 2013); MGE UPS 
Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 366 
(5th Cir. 2010).  As a condition of denying a permanent 
injunction, a district court may impose a running royalty to 
remedy possible future infringement, at least after providing 
the parties with an opportunity to negotiate a rate privately.  
See Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 
1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Patent Act); 4 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 14.06[D] (2018).  A reasonable royalty and 
statutory damages may be imposed even if the accused 
infringer reaps nothing from infringement.  See F. W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 
(1952) (allowing statutory damages “[e]ven for uninjurious 
and unprofitable invasions of copyright”); On Davis, 246 
F.3d at 166 (recognizing that reasonable royalty damages may 
be awarded even if the infringement proves unprofitable).  
Given this arsenal of monetary remedies, a district court can 
still award meaningful monetary relief where, as here, an 
accused infringer distributes an infringing product for free 
and the copyright holder makes no use of a work. 
TD Bank protests that it abandoned its request for 
statutory damages, so it lacks an adequate remedy at law.  But 
where an adequate remedy at law exists, “the party seeking 
redress must pursue it.”  Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton 
& Woolen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 551 (1862) (emphasis added); 
see Goadby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 639 F.2d 117, 122 (3d 
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Cir. 1981); Shaw v. United States, 891 F.2d 602, 603 (6th Cir. 
1989).  TD Bank therefore cannot bolster its case for 
equitable relief by abandoning its request for statutory 
damages. 
To be clear, we in no way suggest that all copyright 
infringement can be adequately remedied through damages; 
that “categorical rule” would flout eBay just as much as a rule 
favoring injunctive relief.  See 547 U.S. at 393.  The 
availability of some legal remedy does not mean such a 
remedy is adequate.  But, at a minimum, where the copyright 
holder presents no evidence of actual harm and relies solely 
on the exclusive nature of the rights conferred by the 
Copyright Act, a district court abuses its discretion by 
concluding that the copyright holder lacks an adequate 
remedy at law. 
3. Balance of Equities  
The District Court’s balance-of-harms analysis suffers 
from much the same flaws as its irreparable-injury 
determination:  It relied solely on TD Bank’s “property 
interest in its copyrighted material”—in other words, the right 
to exclude—and dismissed any hardship that the injunction 
would inflict on Hill because “Hill has a property interest in 
the 2012 Book only to the extent [it] does not infringe the 
2007 Manuscript.”  App. 10.  But by that measure, the 
balance of hardships would always favor the copyright 
holder. 
At least three considerations inform how much 
credence to give a defendant’s claimed hardship: (1) whether 
the defendant’s own financial investment, effort, or 
expressive contribution eclipses the infringing aspect, see 
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Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 84–85 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th 
Cir. 1988), (2) how easily the infringing content could be 
separated from the defendant’s product,12 see Opticians Ass’n 
of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 
1990); Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479, and (3) the degree to which 
the defendant reasonably believed his conduct was non-
infringing, see Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 197; 
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 
1325, 1333 (7th Cir. 1977).  All three factors play a role; no 
matter how much a defendant invests in a product and how 
deeply intertwined that investment is with the infringing 
content, a wanton infringer may deserve little sympathy from 
a court contemplating equitable relief.  See Opticians Ass’n of 
Am., 920 F.2d at 197; Kos Pharm. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
700, 728–29 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to countenance “a 
knowing infringer that constructs its business around its 
infringement” (emphasis added) (citation and internal 
alterations omitted)); see also Douglas Laycock & Richard L. 
Hasen, Modern American Remedies 419–20, 446–47 (5th ed. 
2019) (stressing the defendant’s culpability vel non).  But 
                                              
12 We note that the question of separability in the 
balance of hardships differs from that at issue in the merger 
doctrine.  The merger doctrine, as a narrow defense to 
liability, considers ex ante whether an idea could have been 
expressed in numerous ways, see Educ. Testing Servs., 793 
F.2d at 539, while the balance of hardships assesses 
afterwards how practicable extricating the infringing content 
from the defendant’s product would be, given obstacles such 
as sunk costs and path dependency, see Abend, 863 F.2d at 
1479. 
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even where a defendant makes a strong showing, a copyright 
holder’s hardship may be so devastating that the balance of 
equities nevertheless tips in its favor.  See, e.g., Opticians 
Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 197; Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479 
(declining to issue injunction where the success of the 
infringing work “resulted in large part from factors 
completely unrelated to the underlying story” and “defendants 
could not possibly separate out [their contributions] from the 
underlying work”).  In short, balancing aims “to ensure that 
the issuance of an injunction would not harm the infringer 
more than a denial would harm the [copyright] owner.”  
Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 197. 
Here, considering the interests on both sides, the 
balance of equities favors neither party.  TD Bank has not 
submitted any evidence of actual harm, much less irreparable 
harm.  But the equities do not particularly favor Hill either.  
True, as TD Bank admits, no more than 16% of Hill’s 2012 
book infringes its copyright, and Hill’s ownership defense, 
though ultimately unsuccessful, had considerable merit.  And, 
without TD Bank’s recent concession that the 2016 book does 
not infringe its copyright, we would need to scrutinize 
whether the book could practically be rewritten in a non-
infringing manner without detracting from Hill’s story or 
voice.  With the benefit of hindsight and TD Bank’s recent 
concession, however, we know that Hill needed only about 
one month to develop a non-infringing version.  Under these 
circumstances, we decline to hold that the equities weigh in 
either party’s favor. 
4. Public Interest 
 Hill and amici contend that the District Court erred in 
discounting the harm that the injunction could inflict on the 
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American public by depriving it of the ability to purchase the 
work from any lawful source.  To determine where the public 
interest lies, a court should weigh the “advantages and 
disadvantages” to the public of “employing the extraordinary 
remedy of injunction over the other available methods of 
enforcement.”  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (citation omitted).  We agree 
that this factor weighs against the injunction:  Copyright 
leaves a narrow but important role for weighing the public’s 
right to access expressive works, at least where a copyright 
owner pursues an injunction not to safeguard the commercial 
marketability of a work but merely to suppress unwelcome 
speech. 
Though not “categorically immune from challenges 
under the First Amendment,” copyright law generally does 
not invite First Amendment scrutiny, insofar as “copyright’s 
built-in free speech safeguards”—in particular, the idea-
expression dichotomy and fair use—adequately guarantee 
free expression.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted); 
see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555–60.  And copyright law 
strives to spur the creation and diffusion of free expression by 
granting authors “a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression.”  Id. at 558.  For these reasons, the Supreme 
Court has rebuffed constitutional challenges that would have 
enlarged the fair-use doctrine, id. at 560, or invalidated 
Congress’s retroactive extensions of copyrights, Eldred, 537 
U.S. at 221; Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 335–36 (2012). 
Yet it hardly follows that the public interest always 
favors granting injunctive relief or that, in exercising its 
remedial discretion, a court must ignore whether an injunction 
would indefinitely preclude the public from accessing a work.  
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
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injunctive relief does not always serve copyright’s goal of 
“stimulat[ing] the creation and publication of edifying 
matter.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (citation omitted).  
By considering the public’s interest in accessing works, a 
court does not disturb copyright’s liability regime, see Eldred, 
537 U.S. at 221; Golan, 565 U.S. at 324, but rather exercises 
its centuries-old authority to choose between alternative 
“means of enforcing the statute.”  Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Coop., 532 U.S. at 497–98; see II Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 271 (3d ed. 1843) 
(commending the “wisdom” of courts of equity in “constantly 
declin[ing] to lay down any rule, which shall limit their power 
and discretion as to the particular cases, in which such 
injunctions shall be granted, or withheld”). 
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court and 
other Courts of Appeals have emphasized the right of access 
to works of public interest.  For example, in a case cited 
approvingly by the Supreme Court as an example of where 
the public interest opposed injunctive relief, see Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 578 n.10, the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the 
classic Hitchcock movie “The Rear Window” partly because 
“an injunction could cause public injury by denying the 
public the opportunity to view a classic film for many years to 
come,” Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479.  The Second Circuit 
likewise vacated an injunction enjoining a biography about 
Howard Hughes that allegedly infringed copyrights that 
Hughes had acquired to suppress the work, with a two-judge 
concurrence pointing out that the “spirit of the First 
Amendment” counsels against allowing anyone to use 
copyright to “interfere[] with the public’s right to be informed 
regarding matters of general interest.”  Rosemont Enters., Inc. 
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966); see 
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also Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276 (stressing “the public 
interest is always served in promoting First Amendment 
values”). 
By recognizing the public’s interest in accessing 
intriguing works, we do not countenance blatant piracy or 
indulge in second-guessing of a copyright holder’s business 
model.  Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (focusing on 
derivative works).  And, even where the public interest in 
accessing works may appropriately be considered, a district 
court may well conclude that the public interest nevertheless 
favors injunctive relief.  Cf. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, 
Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that a 
district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing injunction 
relief even though the content owners did not offer a 
competing service).  But, at least where a copyright holder 
wields its exclusive rights to suppress unwelcome speech, a 
district court’s public-interest analysis should consider a 
work’s continued availability. 
Hill may perhaps not be the next prize-winning, or 
even best-selling, business-book author.  But he has a story to 
tell and readers eager to learn from him.  This injunction 
deprived the American public of the ability to purchase this 
book from any lawful source for the foreseeable future.  At 
the same time, whatever spurred TD Bank to bankroll this 
copyright litigation, it was not a desire to protect the 
commercial value of the 2007 manuscript:  By its own 
admission, TD Bank has no real intention of ever publishing 
or licensing that work. 
This injunction also inflicted a far more subtle and 
insidious harm on the public by placing Hill in jeopardy of a 
contempt finding for sharing anything that “sound[s] too 
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much like himself in the 2007 manuscript.”  Br. of Amici 
Intellectual Property Law Professors at 13.  In this manner, a 
copyright injunction can limit the public’s access to 
expressive content well beyond the work at issue in a lawsuit.  
Far from hypothetical, that danger came true here when TD 
Bank threatened to bring a contempt motion against Hill for 
the 2016 book, which it did not retract until its appellate 
response brief.  A less financially secure defendant may well 
have given up.  Thus, on balance, the public interest here also 
militates against this permanent injunction. 
* * * * 
As an appellate court, we police only the margins of a 
district court’s exercise of equitable discretion.  But where, as 
here, a district court strays from a context-specific analysis 
and relies instead on broad propositions, it exceeds the 
bounds of its discretion.  In this case, no invocation of 
abstract principles can obscure that TD Bank suffered no 
actual harm from Hill’s infringement and the Bank had 
adequate remedies at law.  As such, although we will affirm 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to TD Bank 
on ownership and liability, we will vacate the permanent 
injunction and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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COWEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.   
 
 I join in full Parts II and Parts III.A.1, III.A.3, III.B, 
and III.C of the majority opinion, and I agree that we must 
vacate the District Court’s permanent injunction.  I also join 
Part III.A.2 insofar as the majority determines that “the 
District Court was mistaken in concluding that the letter 
agreement vested ownership in the Bank by deeming the 
manuscript a work for hire.”  (Majority Opinion at 21-22.)  
However, I must respectfully dissent from Part III.A.2’s 
assignment analysis.  TD Bank has waived this assignment 
issue, and, in any event, Hill’s commitments fail to “convey 
an unmistakable intent to effect a present transfer of any 
interest he possessed in the manuscript” (id. at 24).  
Accordingly, I would vacate the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the threshold question of ownership 
and remand for further proceedings.    
 “[W]e may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record, even if it departs from the District Court’s rationale.”  
(Id. at 14 (citing Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 
F.2d 1084, 1089 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1988)).)  “However, this rule 
does not apply to cases in which the party has waived the 
issue in the district court.”  Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 
575 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2009).  “This Court has stated:  
‘We may affirm the lower court’s ruling on different grounds, 
provided the issue which forms the basis of our decision was 
before the lower court.’”  Id. at 335-36 (quoting Morse v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 904 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1997)).  A review of “the record” in this case reveals that TD 
Bank has intentionally and knowingly abandoned the issue of 
assignment.  See, e.g., Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action 
Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2019) (“‘Waiver is the 
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‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.’” (quoting Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley 
Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017))).      
 It is undisputed that TD Bank failed to argue below 
that, even if the 2007 manuscript does not rise to the level of 
a work for hire, Hill assigned any interest he may have had in 
the manuscript to Commerce Bank.  But TD Bank did more 
than merely fail to raise a particular issue.  It affirmatively 
conceded that the letter “is not an assignment.”   
In “Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendant’s First Set of 
Requests for Admissions,” TD Bank made the following 
admission: 
26. Admit that Mr. Hill never signed a 
document or any other writing assigning right, 
title or interest in the Unpublished Manuscript 
to Commerce. 
 OBJECTION:  Plaintiff objects as “any 
other writing” is vague and is nowhere defined 
and requires Plaintiff to speculate as to 
meaning.    
RESPONSE:  Subject to the foregoing 
objection and without waiving the same, 
admitted to the extent that the Guaranty is not 
an assignment but rather an acknowledgement 
that Commerce is the initial owner of the 
copyright in the Unpublished Manuscript. 
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(JA1307; see also id. (making same objection and response to 
request to admit that Hill never signed document or any other 
writing assigning right, title, or interest to TD Bank).)   
TD Bank thereby admitted that the letter is not an 
assignment but rather an acknowledgement that Commerce 
Bank has always been the copyright owner from (to borrow 
language from TD Bank’s appellate brief) “day one” pursuant 
to the work-for-hire doctrine (Appellee’s Brief at 37).  “The 
purpose of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36(a) is to 
narrow the issues for trial to those which are genuinely 
contested.”  United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 
958, 967 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. 
Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197, 
201 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).  TD Bank did not deny Hill’s request 
for admission.  See, e.g., id. (“Where, as here, issues in 
dispute are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly 
reasonable response.”).  In fact, TD Bank responded to 
similar admission requests by denying them, quoting or 
referencing, inter alia, the letter, and asserting that the 
document spoke for itself.  It also could have answered in the 
alternative if it really believed that the letter could be 
considered an assignment.  For instance, it could have stated 
that, while the document constitutes an acknowledgement of 
Commerce Bank’s initial ownership, “the Guaranty is an 
assignment” to the extent Commerce Bank is not considered 
to be the initial owner.  But it did not do so.  Instead of 
leaving open the possibility that it became the copyright 
owner by means of a transfer or assignment from the original 
owner (or co-owner), TD Bank went so far as to emphasize 
the term “initial” in “the initial owner.”  Similarly, 
“Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of 
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Material Facts Not in Dispute In Support of Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment” stated:  “Undisputed that the 
Guaranty does not contain such an express provision [in 
which Mr. Hill assigned any right, title, or interest in the 
Unpublished Manuscript to Commerce].”  (JA1388).  
“Disputed that the lack of such a provision provides Mr. Hill 
with any ownership interest in the copyright in the 2007 
Manuscript.”  (Id. (citing JA477, JA1139).)   
TD Bank’s pattern of failing to raise or contest the 
issue of assignment has continued on appeal.   
In his opening appellate brief, Hill argues at some 
length that the District Court erred in relying on the letter.  
“The only inquiry to which these contracts might be relevant 
is whether, after Mr. Hill’s ownership vested, he executed an 
agreement transferring the copyright after creation, in 
accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 204.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 47-
48 (citing Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 68 (3d Cir. 
2014)).)  Citing to TD Bank’s Responses to Defendant’s First 
Set of Requests for Admissions, Hill asserts that “TD Bank 
concedes that no such writing exists,” which, in turn, 
purportedly entitles him to judgment as a matter of law.  (Id. 
at 48 (citing JA1307).)  According to Hill, the District Court, 
among other things, failed to analyze the statutory writing 
requirement, acknowledge TD Bank’s admission, properly 
apply New York’s contract law in its consideration of the 
letter and the publishing agreement, or recognize that there is 
a presumption against transfers of copyright ownership unless 
they are clearly stated.  In the process, Hill (indirectly) cites 
TD Bank’s Response to Defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement of 
Material Facts Not in Dispute In Support of Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment.  (See id. (“In fact, there is no 
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evidence of any agreement over copyright ownership between 
Commerce and Mr. Hill, whose signatures never appear on 
the same contract.” (citing JA1586)).)   
Faced with these assertions, one would expect TD 
Bank to respond (at least in the form of an alternative 
argument) that Hill did assign any interest he may have had in 
the manuscript pursuant to § 204 and New York law.  At the 
very least, it would be expected that a litigant would deny an 
adversary’s concession assertion if it truly believed that no 
such thing had occurred.  Yet TD Bank does nothing of the 
sort.  Instead, it simply characterizes Hill’s contention “[t]hat 
‘[t]he Guaranty never says that Mr. Hill agrees to transfer 
exclusive ownership to Commerce’” as “a basic mistake 
regarding the Copyright Act’s ‘work made for hire’ 
provision.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 37 (quoting Appellant’s 
Brief at 48).)  “Because the 2007 Manuscript was a ‘work 
made for hire,’ (see [id. at 39-47]), TD Bank is the work’s 
statutory ‘author’ and sole copyright owner on day one, 17 
U.S.C. § 201(b), and no transfer to TD Bank is required.”  
(Id.)  According to TD Bank, it is actually Hill’s obligation to 
produce a written agreement transferring ownership to him.   
TD Bank did not argue that there was any assignment 
from Hill to Commerce Bank until oral argument, after this 
Court directed the parties to be prepared to discuss this issue 
of whether the letter constitutes a valid assignment under 
New York law and the Copyright Act.  I do not believe it is 
appropriate for us to overlook what TD Bank (an obviously 
sophisticated litigant represented by able counsel) has done—
and not done—regarding the issue of assignment throughout 
the course of this litigation.  Recently, this Court considered a 
party’s course of conduct to decide that it had waived its 
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objection to a particular jury instruction.  See, e.g., Robinson, 
920 F.3d at 184 (“We hold that First State has waived this 
argument because of its continued acquiescence to 
Robinson’s case theory, its encouragement of the adoption of 
the very jury instruction to which it now objects, and its 
failure to include this error in its post-trial briefing.”).  In 
turn, the ground upon which Erie Telecommunications relied 
was raised in one of the appellee’s affirmative defenses, 
summarily rejected by the district court, and then addressed in 
the brief that the appellee filed on appeal.  Erie Telecomms., 
853 F.2d at 1088 & n.8, 1094 n.16.  Given its concession 
below that the letter is not an assignment as well as its 
dismissal on appeal of Hill’s own assignment assertions, TD 
Bank has waived the assignment issue.   
Assuming arguendo that the issue of assignment is 
properly before us, I do not agree with the majority’s 
conclusion that Hill’s letter meets the legal requirements for 
an assignment of a copyright interest.  As the majority 
recognizes, “courts do not lightly infer that a party has 
assigned his interest in a copyright, particularly given the 
Copyright Act’s writing requirement, and in doubtful cases, a 
document should not be construed to divest an author 
completely of his ownership interest.”  (Majority Opinion at 
25 (citing Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 
500 (5th Cir. 2012); Radio Television Espanola S.A. v. New 
World Entm’t, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 564 (2d Cir. 
1995)).)  Under applicable New York law, a contract is 
unambiguous if its language possesses “‘a definite and 
precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in 
the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which 
there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.’”  
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Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170-11 
(N.Y. 2002) (quoting Breed v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 385 N.E.2d 
1280, 1282 (N.Y. 1978)).   
The letter here is doubtful and ambiguous.   
According to the majority, “Hill’s commitments 
together convey an unmistakable intent to effect a present 
transfer of any interest he possessed in the manuscript.”  (Id. 
at 24.)  I agree that no specific language is necessary to 
satisfy the requirements for an effective assignment under 
state and federal law.  See, e.g., Radio Television Espanola, 
183 F.3d at 927 (“No magic words must be included in a 
document to satisfy § 204(a).”); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 
Co. v. Romano, 147 A.D.3d 1021, 1023 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017) (observing that no special language or formalities are 
necessary to effect assignment).  Nevertheless, the assignor 
must in some fashion have “‘manifested an intention to make 
a present transfer of his rights to the assignee.’”  Deutsche 
Bank, 147 A.D.3d at 1023 (quoting 9-47 Corbin on Contracts 
§ 47.7); see, e.g., Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV 
Publishing, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“Nevertheless, ‘[s]o long as the parties’ intent is clear, a 
transfer of copyright need not include any particular 
language.’” (quoting Gilleland v. Schanhals, 55 F. App’x 257, 
260 (6th Cir. 2003)).  According to the Ninth Circuit: 
Section 204’s writing requirement is not 
unduly burdensome; it necessitates neither 
protracted negotiations nor substantial expense.  
The rule is really quite simple:  If the copyright 
holder agrees to transfer ownership to another 
party, that party must get the copyright holder 
to sign a piece of paper saying so.  It doesn’t 
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have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro 
forma statement will do. 
Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 
1990).   
Neither the letter nor the publishing agreement 
included “a one-line pro forma statement.”  Specifically, the 
documentation at issue here did not state that Hill is 
assigning, transferring, or granting his copyright interest in 
the manuscript to Commerce Bank—nor did it say that such 
an assignment, transfer, or grant had already occurred (or 
would take place in the future).  See, e.g., Baisden, 693 F.3d 
at 500 (“That [royalty] check merely states that it was for 
‘Men Cry in the Dark Fall 2005 Royalties (Paid in Full).’  
The check does not expressly refer to an assignment of 
copyrights.  See [Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 564] (applying 
clearly erroneous standard and deferring to district court’s 
determination that check for past ‘assignment . . . of all rights, 
title and interest’ was insufficient to transfer copyrights).”).  
Certainly, the inclusion of this sort of language would have 
dispelled doubt and “convey an unmistakable intent” to effect 
a transfer (id. at 24).  Although not strictly required as a 
matter of law (see id. at 25 n.8), the existence of a document 
executed by the putative assignor and assignee would also 
have been stronger evidence of an assignment than what we 
have here, i.e., a publishing agreement executed by 
Commerce Bank and Portfolio, and a letter signed by Hill 
addressed to Portfolio.    
In turn, Hill’s letter to Portfolio and the publishing 
agreement between Commerce Bank and Portfolio could be 
reasonably read as indicating that there was no copyright 
assignment.  As the majority explains, the letter consists of 
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two principal covenants:  (1) “Hill acknowledged the 
publishing agreement, a copy of which was attached to the 
letter, and ‘guarantee[d], promise[d] and agree[d] with the 
Publisher . . . that the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] will, in 
all respects, faithfully perform and fulfill all obligations of the 
Agreement’” (id. at 23 (quoting JA1139)); and (2) “Hill 
‘unconditionally guarantee[d] that the Work is a work made 
for hire within the meaning of the United States Copyright 
Law and that the Author is the owner of copyright in the 
Work and has full power and authority to enter into the 
Agreement’” (id. (quoting JA1139)).  “That publishing 
agreement provided that ‘the Author [i.e., Commerce Bank] is 
the sole and exclusive owner of all rights granted to the 
Publisher in this Agreement and has not assigned, pledged or 
otherwise encumbered the same; . . . that the Author has full 
power to enter into this Agreement and to make the grants 
herein contained.’”  (Id. (quoting JA1142).)  The 
documentation thereby indicates that the letter itself 
constitutes a guarantee as opposed to an assignment—and 
that Commerce Bank “is the work’s statutory ‘author’ and 
sole copyright owner on day one and no transfer to 
[Commerce Bank] is required” (Appellee’s Brief at 37 
(citation omitted)). 
 According to the majority, the latter provisions of the 
letter do not resemble a true guarantee.  But it also 
acknowledges that Hill’s commitment guaranteeing, 
promising, and agreeing that Commerce Bank would fulfill its 
obligations “could by itself suggest a guarantee” (Majority 
Opinion at 24).  While not dispositive, the repeated use of this 
sort of “guarantee” language (at the very least) represents a 
highly unconventional expression of an intent to effect a 
transfer.  Furthermore, the cited cases did not consider 
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whether the “guarantee” at issue actually constituted an 
assignment under New York law.  See, e.g., N.Y. Plumber’s 
Specialties Co. v. 91 E. End Corp., 366 N.E.2d 866, 867 
(N.Y. 1977) (“Although described as a guarantee this writing 
is actually an agreement or promise to pay appellant’s own 
obligation for purchases made on its own account.” (quoting 
Deeves & Son v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 88 N.E. 395, 396 
(N.Y. 1909))); Brewster Transit Mix Corp. v. McLean, 169 
A.D.2d 1036, 1037 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“Despite the 
parties’ use of the word guarantee, we are of the view that the 
nature of defendant’s obligation is the same as that of his 
corporation and, therefore, the only reasonable interpretation 
of the writing is that which makes defendant a co-obligor of 
his corporation’s debts to plaintiff, not a guarantor of the 
payment of those debts.” (citing Am. Trading Co. v. Fish, 42 
N.Y.2d 20, 24 (1977))).  Even if parts of the letter do not 
really look like a typical guarantee (i.e., an agreement to pay 
a principal obligor’s debt upon the principal obligor’s 
default), the same could be said with respect to the letter’s 
resemblance to an assignment, especially given what the 
document did not say (and what it did).  In fact, Hill stated in 
the letter that “I have an interest in the Author [Commerce 
Bank] and in having the Work published by the Publisher,” 
and thereby made these guarantees “as an inducement to the 
Publisher to enter into the Agreement.” (JA1139.)  He clearly 
wanted the book to be published as opposed to expressing any 
sort of interest in effecting an assignment of his existing 
copyright interest to his employer.  In fact, I question whether 
he was really concerned with the intricacies of copyright 
assignment and the work-for-hire doctrine in the first place.       
 Finally, the differences between assignment and the 
concept of a work for hire weigh against the majority’s 
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assignment determination.  The agreement and the letter 
could be reasonably read as acknowledging that Commerce 
Bank was always the exclusive owner of the manuscript as a 
work for hire.  After all, the letter basically said as much, 
unconditionally guaranteeing that the manuscript “is a work 
made for hire within the meaning of the United States 
Copyright Law and that the Author is the owner of copyright 
in the Work and has full power and authority to enter into the 
Agreement.”  (JA1139.)  Commerce Bank warranted in the 
publishing agreement that it “is the sole and exclusive owner 
of all rights granted to the Publisher in this Agreement” and 
“has full power to enter into this Agreement and to make the 
grants herein contained.”  (JA1142.)  The majority asserts 
that, although Hill’s assurance that the manuscript is a work 
made for hire is insufficient to make it one, this assurance 
nevertheless “denotes an intent to relinquish his interest in the 
copyright.”  (Majority Opinion at 25 (citing 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 5.03[B][1][b][ii])).)  However, assignment and 
work for hire are two different concepts.  As I have already 
explained in my waiver discussion, TD Bank characterizes 
Hill’s assignment assertions as fundamentally mistaken.  It is 
TD Bank who insists that, because the manuscript is a work 
for hire, “TD Bank [as Commerce Bank’s successor] is the 
work’s statutory ‘author’ and sole copyright owner on day 
one and no transfer to TD Bank is required.”  (Appellee’s 
Brief at 37 (citation omitted).)  Where a work is made for 
hire, “the employer . . . is considered the author for purposes 
of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed 
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the 
rights comprised in the copyright.”  § 201(b).  In contrast, a 
transfer or assignment implicates “the conveyance” (as § 
204(a) puts it) of the owner’s interest to another.  A “work for 
hire” characterization thereby indicates that the employer has 
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been the exclusive copyright owner from the very beginning.  
Nimmer does state that an agreement whereby works 
prepared by the employee but not prepared within the scope 
of employment are deemed to be works made for hire “may 
be regarded as the equivalent of a simple transfer of copyright 
from the employee to the employer.”  1 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 5.03[B][1][b][ii].  But the treatise does not provide any 
further explanation, and it immediately qualifies the statement 
itself by pointing to additional differences between a transfer 
and a work for hire, id. (“but will not trigger the various other 
legal consequences that flow from the status of a ‘for hire’ 
work” (footnote omitted)).  (See, e.g., Majority Opinion at 
20-21 & n.7 (pointing out that work’s status determines 
duration of copyright, author retains certain non-waivable 
rights to cancel transfer after 35-40 years and perhaps 
waivable moral rights in proper attribution, and creator of 
work for hire lacks such rights).)  In any event, the specific 
letter at issue here still fails to manifest “an unmistakable 
intent to effect a present transfer” of Hill’s copyright interest 
(id. at 24). 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the District 
Court’s summary judgment disposition on the question of 
copyright ownership and remand for further proceedings.   
 
